Jobs arrive at a buffer from which there are several parallel routes to a destination. A socially optimal policy is one which minimizes the average delay of all jobs, whereas an individually optimal policy is one, which for each job, minimizes its own delay, with route preference given to jobs at the head of the buffer. If there is a socially optimal policy for a system with no arrivals, which can be inmplemented by each job following a policy y in such a way that no job ever utilizes a previously declined route, then we show that such a y is an individually optimal policy for each job. Moreover y continues to be individually optimal even if the system has an arbitrary arrival process, subject only to the restriction that past arrivals are independent of future route traversal times. Thus, y is an individually optimal policy which is insensitive to the nature of the arrival process.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the system of Figure 1 . Jobs arrive into Route 1
Buffer
Route 2 Destination Arrivals FIGURE 1 a buffer from which there are s parallel routes to a destination. Each job wishes to minimizes its own delay, which is the expected duration of time from the arrival of the job to the time at which it reaches its destination. Every route can accomodate only one job at a time, and a route is idle if no job is currently on that route.
At every time instant, all the currently idle routes are offered to the job occupying the first position, and it can either choose to traverse one of them or decline all the currently idle routes and continue to wait. Then, all the (remaining) idle routes are offered to the job in the second position, then the third position and so on till the end of the buffer.
A policy for a job which specifies when it should choose or decline an offered idle route, and which minimizes the delay for that job, will be called an individually optimal policy. We seek to determine such individually optimal policies.
Instead of considering such individually optimal policies, one can also seek to obtain a policy which minimizes the average delay of all jobs. Such a policy will be called a socially optimal policy.
In general, the notions of social and individual optimality do not coincide, because a socially optimal policy may "sacrifice" one job if by doing so it can lessen the overall delays of all jobs. In contrast, a job implementing an individually optimal policy will never make such sacrifices.
Our main results are the following.
Theorem 1
Assume that (l.i) The system has no arrivals.
(l.ii) There is a socially optimal policy E which can be implemented by each job individually implementing a policy y.
(l.iii) Under y, if a job ever declines an offered idle route, then it will never thereafter utilize that route.
Then, Y is an individually optimal policy for this system.
Theorem 2
The policy Y of Theorem 1 is not only optimal for a system with no arrivals, but is also optimal for all arrival processes which satisfy:
Past arrivals are independent of future route traversal (2) times. and the arrival process satisfies (2) . Define
Then, an individually optimal policy Y is given by the following rule: T increases and converges to T 2 as +0O, see [3] , but this result has still not been rigorously proved. Recently, Walrand [4] has obtained another proof of the threshold result of [3] using stochastic coupling arguments instead of the policy iteration argument used in [3] . For the case of s>2 routes, the problem is still open. In Lin and Kumar [3] it is conjectured that the socially optimal policy is given by threshold functions 
II. A FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT
Before presenting the proof, we present a tempting argument just for Theorem 3, which suggests itself, but which is fallacious.
Suppose that a job is in position c and route j is the fastest idle It is therefore somewhat surprising that the policy of Theorem 3 is indeed individually optimal.
III. PROOFS
We shall first prove Theorems 1 and 2 simultaneously. The proof is by induction. Suppose that there is only one job in the buffer and there are no arrivals to the buffer. Then individual and social optimality coincide, and so by (l.ii), the policy y is individually optimal in this situation.
One property is important.
(P) Since there is no one in the buffer behind the job, and no future arrivals, the job can always utilize a route that it previously chose to decline. This is because an idle route remains idle forever if this one job has declined it.
Suppose now that there are possibly other jobs in the buffer behind the job in position 1, and arrivals satisfying (2) The induction is now complete, and we have proved that the suggested policy Y is individually optimal in the situations of Theorems 1 and 2.
Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 3. We use the result of Agrawala,
Coffman, Garey and Tripathi [1] that the policy iT of (6) is socially optimal when (3.i,ii) are true and no arrivals are present. Now consider the policy y suggested in (5). First, we show that when all jobs implement y, then E will be implemented, which will show that (l.ii) is satisfied.
Suppose there are c jobs in the buffer and route j is the fastest idle route available. If c<T. then all jobs in the buffer will, one by one, -J decline route j since they are following the rule (5) and their positions are all less than or equal to c,and so (6) is implemented. If c>Tj, then one job, namely the k-th one where k is the smallest integer greater than T. will utilize route j, and so again (6) is implemented. Hence (l.ii)
is satisfied. Now we show (l.iii). Let k be the position of job which declines route j, the fastest idle route offered to it. Since y is implementing (5), k<T.. As time goes on, the job, if it has not already utilized some route, can only improve its position, i.e. its position can only decrease. Since T. remains fixed, its position will never thereafter exceed T. and so route j will never be utilized by this job. Hence (l.iii) 3
is satisfied, and the proof Theorem 3 is complete.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We do not expect that the condition (l.iii) will hold in all situations.
We have however seen one situation, namely the exponential routes case of Theorem 3 where conditions (l.ii,iii) are satisfied.
Are there other situations of more general "service" times, where conditions (l.ii,iii) hold? The problem here is that not much progress has been made on the problem of social optimality when there are no arrivals, other than in the exponential routes case of [1] .
We conjecture that if (7.i) the hazard rate of each server is an increasing function '(7) (7.ii)
The range [hi,h i ] of the hazard rate of each server i is such that h+l< h., then, the socially optimal policy in the case of no arrivals will indeed satisfy (l.ii,iii). Thus, we conjecture that the strong result of Theorem 2, namely the existence of an individually optimal policy insensitive to the arrival process, will be true when (7.i,ii) are satisfied. It is also reasonable to guess that it will be of threshold type, where the threshold function depends on the server states.
